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A welfare comparison of historical cost and fair value accounting
regimes
Palmer Edholm

Abstract
With ongoing controversy concerning fair value and historical cost accounting, existing accounting theory is focused on intra-firm decision making and is thus deficient in addressing the
issue of maximizing social welfare. I propose models of historical cost and fair value accounting
regimes which are embedded in models of monopoly and oligopoly. This allows for social welfare
implications. I find that historical cost results in greater expected profits for both monopolists
and oligopolists. However, if the market is elastic enough, a fair value regimes is welfare enhancing. Whereas, if the market is inelastic enough, historical cost is welfare enhancing.
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Introduction

On December 5, 2000, Jackson Day, Deputy Chief Accountant of the SEC, spoke in front of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and declared that “all financial
instruments should be measured at fair value” ([4]). However, the SEC has delegated the task of
passing accounting standards to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In September
2006, with the passage of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS 157), the FASB updated
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to include a generalized framework for fair
value accounting. With many subsequent standards and codifications, the FASB has ultimately
showed that it agrees with Mr. Day. SFAS 157 was codified as Accounting Standards Codification
Topic 820 (ASC 820). In ASC 820, the FASB defined fair value as “the price that would be
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market
participants at the measurement date” ([1]). Many have been critical of such a regime change
arguing that it subjects managers to too much subjectivity in having to determine fair market
value of assets for which no liquid market exists. There is extensive literature, both empirical
and theoretical, on the pros and cons of a fair value regime. However, the one thing lacking in
all such literature, is aggregate effects. Existing literature focuses on the effects of fair value on
managerial compensation, manipulation of standards, disclosure behavior, etc. The motivation of
this paper is to assess the social welfare of a fair value regime versus that of a historical cost regime.

Models of both historical cost and fair value accounting regimes are proposed. To evaluate the
welfare effects, they are embedded in a traditional monopoly and an n firm Cournot oligopoly
model. To assess to what degree the result that is optimal for social welfare agrees with what is
optimal for the firm, expected profits are calculated. Existing research would seem to form the
hypothesis that social welfare is greater under a fair value regime because it benefits from more
relevant information. However, fair value detractors claim that fair value provides managers with
leeway when reporting earnings making reports less reliable for users of financial statements. This
would seem to imply that managers manipulate earnings to the detriment of social welfare. The
paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews all relevant research, section 3 examines the welfare
comparison in a monopoly model, and section 4 examines the welfare comparison in an n firm
oligopoly model.
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Literature Review

The majority of accounting research is focused on intra-firm decision making where aggregate
effects are ignored. Where the purview of this paper is on the social welfare of accounting
decisions, models from existing research, while enlightening, were not utilized when constructing
the models used herein. In perhaps the most relevant research, Dye ([6]) utilizes an overlapping
generations model to examine the incentives shareholders have to allow managers to engage in
earnings management. Dye and Sridhar ([7]) create a model where the accountant is contracted to
produce a report based on the aggregated information he gets from the manager where reliability
versus relevancy trade-offs arrive when assessing how much weight to place on the information
from the manager. Darrough ([3]) looks at disclosure behavior in an oligopolistic environment
where there are no mandatory disclosures. Crocker and Slemrod ([2]) create a model of managerial
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compensation where managers take a costly hidden action and then generate an inflated earnings
report with results very similar to [6]. More recently, Kanodia and Sapra ([8]) address the effects
of fair value measurement on the firm’s investment efficiency and in creating procyclical real
effects. Plantin et al. ([9]) show why financial institutions are more apt to prefer historical cost
to fair value. The literature on disclosures, standards manipulation, earnings management, and
conservatism as they relate to fair value is quite extensive but such issues are assumed away in the
models used in this paper.

Empirically, Song et al. ([10]) find value relevance of level 1 and level 2 fair values where level 3
fair values provide value relevance conditioned on strong corporate governance. Dechow et al. ([5])
find that when managers use fair value standards to value retained interest, they’re awarded for
the gains reported regardless of monitoring efforts.

3
3.1

Monopoly Model
Timeline

The manager is tasked with choosing a cost-reducing investment and production level. I assume
the investment is non-depreciable to make the model more straightforward. Finding the optimal
strategy is done via backward induction of a three stage game of incomplete information that the
manager plays with nature. In the first stage, the manager chooses an investment level. In the
second stage, after observing the investment made by the manager, nature chooses the cost type.
After observing the cost type, the manager makes a production commitment which determines the
firm’s payoff.

The specifics of the model at each stage of the game follow the timeline of events as outlined in
figure 1. I assume the manager is contracted by the shareholders to choose an investment I ∈ [0, 1]
such that firm profits will be maximized. In order to do so, the manager signs a contract wherein
she agrees to be compensated based on a fraction (α ∈ (0, 1]) of net income. After the contract is
signed, the manager chooses an investment level which is publicly observable. After the investment
choice is made, nature chooses between high (cH ) and low (cL ) constant marginal costs. This
binary assumption, along with the asssumption of constant marginal costs, is solely for purposes
of tractability. I assume the investment is cost-reducing. To model the incentive to choose a cost
reducing investment, I assume linear probability functions: P (H) = 1−I associated with high costs
and P (L) = I associated with low costs. These probability functions are assumed for mathematical
simplicity. I assume the true type chosen by nature is only observable to the manager. Once the
manager privately observes her type, she chooses a production quantity which maximizes expected
profit. Once a production commitment has been made, the manager is then compensated based
on her report. We may assume the report in question is the income statement and the manager is
compensated based on her agreed upon proportion (α) of net income.
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Figure 1: Timeline of events

3.2

Historical Cost

For everything that follows, I assume historical cost and fair value regimes are mutually exclusive to
be able to make a general statement about which regime is welfare enhancing. When an investment
is acquired, there is no immediate effect on owner’s equity. Furthermore, in a historical cost regime,
assuming the investment is non-depreciable, the balance sheet value never changes. I assume a linear
inverse demand function for tractability. Therefore, the firms profit function is defined as
π(q) = (a − bq)q − cj q
with constant marginal costs and j ∈ {L, H}. Therefore, I define the manager’s objective function
when choosing the optimal q to be the present value of future discounted cash flows. Thus, the
objective function is
#
"∞
X
m(q)HC = α
π(q)δ t
t=0

where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the relevant discount factor. Because δ ∈ [0, 1), this is nothing more than a
geometric series which converges to
απ(q)
m(q)HC =
.
1−δ
Therefore, the optimal choice of q is
max m(q)HC
q

which turns out to be

a − cj
.
(1)
2b
Given (1), I can continue backward inducting and solve for the optimal investment level. The choice
of I, in deriving the perfect Bayes’ Nash equilibrium, is
q∗ =

max
I

H
L
P (H)m(q ∗ )cHC
+ P (L)m(q ∗ )cHC

where the superscripts cH and cL denote the optimal q conditioned on high and low costs, respectively. Using (1), I find that the objective function is linear in I which implies a corner solution.
The slope of the optimal investment level is
α(cH − cL )(2a − cH − cL )
4b(1 − δ)
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which is always positive. This implies that the equilibrium strategy in a historical cost regime is
to choose I = 1 which implies low costs. Given this equilibrium strategy, solving for the firm’s
expected profit, I find that
(a − cL )2
π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
.
(2)
4b

3.3

Fair Value

Under a fair value regime, period 0 is identical to a historical cost regime. However, under fair value,
beginning at period 1, the investment is subject to periodic assessment that the balance sheet may
reflect the current value of the investment. I don’t assume anything about how conservative the fair
value accounting standards are. Assuming an efficient market, the true value of the investment to
the firm is the profitability of the firm with the investment less the profitability of the firm without
the investment. With the investment (I ∈ (0, 1]), the profit function is
π I (q) = (a − bq)q − cj q.
Without the investment (I = 0), costs would be high by definition and the profit function becomes
π −I (q) = (a − bq)q − cH q.
Taking the difference of these two equations, I find that
π I (q) − π −I (q) = q(cH − cj ).

(3)

The intuition behind (3) is clear: if j = H, then I = 0 and (3) evaluates to 0. If j = L, then I = 1
and (3) is how much more the firm is producing given that they can now claim low costs. Thus,
(3) is the difference in production between investing and not investing. Therefore, any objective
function will allow for the manager to choose a q such that the present value of future cash flows
attributed to firm profits are maximized and those attributed to gains (losses) on investment are
maximized (minimized). The resulting objective function is
"∞
#
∞
X
X
 t
t
I
−I
m(q)F V = α
π(q)δ − I +
π (q) − π (q) δ
t=0

t=1

which, after substituting in (3), converges to


π(q)
δ
m(q)F V = α
− I + [q(cH − cj )]
.
1−δ
1−δ
Therefore, the optimal choice of q is
max
q

m(q)F V

which turns out to be

a − cj + (cH − cj )δ
.
(4)
2b
Given (4), I can continue backward inducting and solve for the optimal investment level. The choice
of I, in deriving perfect Bayes’ Nash equilibrium, is
q∗ =

max
I

P (H)m(q ∗ )cFHV + P (L)m(q ∗ )cFLV .
4

Using (4), I find that the objective function is linear in I which implies a corner solution. The slope
of the optimal investment level is
−α +

α(cH − cL )(1 + δ)(2a + cH (δ − 1) − cL (1 + δ))
4b(1 − δ)

which is positive if
(cH − cL )(1 + δ)(2a + cH (δ − 1) − cL (1 + δ))
4(1 − δ)

0<b<

(5)

holds and negative if
b<

(cH − cL )(1 + δ)(2a + cH (δ − 1) − cL (1 + δ))
4(1 − δ)

(6)

holds. Assuming inequality (5) holds implies that the equilibrium strategy is to choose I = 1 which
implies low costs. Given this equilibrium strategy, solving for the firm’s expected profit, I find that
π ∗ (q ∗ ) =

(a − cL )2 − δ 2 (cL − cH )2
.
4b

(7)

Assuming inequality (6) holds implies that the equilibrium strategy is to choose I = 0 which implies
high costs. Given this equilibrium strategy, solving for the firm’s expected profit, I find that
π ∗ (q ∗ ) =

3.4

(a − cH )2
.
4b

(8)

Welfare Implications

If I assume inequality (5) holds, then the equilibrium investment level is I = 1 under both regimes.
Therefore, conditioned on j = L, the optimal output levels under historical cost and fair value will
be (1) and (4), respectively. Conditioned on j = L, (4) > (1) which implies that output is higher
under fair value. However, expected firm profits for historical cost and fair value are (2) and (7),
respectively. (2) > (7) which implies that expected profit is greater under historical cost. The
measure of social welfare that I’ll employ is consumer surplus plus firm profit. Therefore, under
historical cost, welfare is
Z

q∗

p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =

0

5a2 − 6acL + c2L
.
8b

Under fair value, welfare is
Z
0

q∗

p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =

(a + cH δ − cL (1 + δ))(5a − 3cH δ + cL (3δ − 1))
.
8b

Therefore, welfare is greater under fair value if cH ≤ 5cL .
If I assume inequality (8) holds, then the equilibrium investment level is I = 1 under historical
cost and I = 0 under fair value. Therefore, conditioned on j = L, the optimal output level under
5

historical cost is (1) and conditioned on j = H, the optimal output level under fair value is (4).
Under these conditions, (1) > (4). Expected firm profits for historical cost and fair value are (2)
and (8) respectively. (2) > (8) implies that expected profit is greater under historical cost. Social
welfare under historical cost then becomes
Z q∗
5a2 − 6acL + c2L
p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
8b
0
while social welfare under fair value is
Z q∗
5a2 − 6acH + c2H
p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
.
8b
0
Therefore, social welfare is greater under historical cost.

Notice that the inequalities that result in different equilibrium strategies have to do with the slope
of the demand curve. Under historical cost, the cost of the investment is always covered which is
why the manager always prefers lower costs even if it is not efficient to do so. However, under fair
value, the cost of the investment is measured against the increase in profit from doing so. For this
reason, investing is not always efficient under fair value if it does not result in a greater increase
in profitability relative to the elasticity of the market.

As is evident, a historical cost regime is strictly preferred by the monopolist which, given my
assumptions, is a result consistent with that of [9] who find that historical cost is preferred by
banks and insurance companies because of the inefficiencies fair value induces given the nature of
their assets. Concerning social welfare, depending on the size of b, historical cost may or may not
be welfare enhancing. The inequalities above state that for a small b, fair value implies greater
social welfare while for a larger b, historical cost implies greater social welfare. This would seem
to imply that which regime is better for the aggregate economy depends on the elasticity of the
market.

4

Oligopoly Model

Extending the monopoly model to an oligopoly model, I’ll employ the Cournot model. Assume
there are n symmetric firms (an assumption made to more easily derive the optimal strategy of
each firm) and each firm simultaneously and independently commits to an output level qi . Let qi
denote the production choice of firm i and
q=

n
X

qi

i=1

denote the aggregate quantity produced by all n firms. Following convention, let
X
q − qi = q−i =
qi
i̸=j

denote the aggregate production quantity of all n firms with the exception of firm i. Assume the
same linear inverse demand function used in part 3. Firm i’s profit function becomes
πi (q−i , qi ) = (a − b(qi + q−i ))qi + cj qi .
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4.1

Historical Cost

The definitions of the objective functions have the same motivation as in part 3. Therefore, when
choosing qi , the objective function is
m(qi )HC =

απi (q−i , qi )
1−δ

where the choice of qi is
max
qi

m(qi )HC .

Solving this problem yields firm i’s reaction function which is
qi∗ =

a − cj
1
− q−i .
2b
2

This reaction function induces the system of n first-order conditions
α
[−bq1∗ + (a − bq ∗ ) − cj ] = 0
1−δ
α
[−bq2∗ + (a − bq ∗ ) − cj ] = 0
1−δ
..
.
α
∗
[−bqn + (a − bq ∗ ) − cj ] = 0.
1−δ
Solving the system yields

a − cj n
(9)
b n+1
which is the perfect Bayes’ Nash equilibrium quantity. Given the assumption of n symmetric firms,
the equilibrium quantity for firm i is
a − cj
qi∗ =
.
(10)
b(n + 1)
q∗ =

Given (10), I continue backward inducting. The choice of I, in deriving the perfect Bayes’ Nash
equilibrium, is
H
L
.
max P (H)m(qi∗ )cHC
+ P (L)m(qi∗ )cHC
I

Given (10), I find that the objective function is linear in I which implies a corner solution. The
slope of the optimal investment level is
α(cH − cL )(2a − cH − cL )
b(n + 1)2 (1 − δ)
which is always positive. This implies that the equilibrium strategy in a historical cost regime is
to choose I = 1 which implies low costs. Given this equilibrium strategy, solving for the firm’s
expected profit, I find that
(a − cL )2
πi∗ (qi∗ ) =
.
(11)
b(n + 1)2
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4.2

Fair Value

When choosing qi , the objective function is


π(qi , q−i )
δ
m(qi )F V = α
− I + [qi (cH − cj ) − I]
1−δ
1−δ
where the choice of qi is
max
qi

m(qi )F V .

Solving this problem yields firm i’s reaction function which is
qi∗ =

a − cj + (cH − cj )δ 1
− q−i .
2b
2

This reaction function induces the system of n first-order conditions
α
[−bq1∗ + (a − bq ∗ ) − cj + (cH − cj )δ] = 0
1−δ
α
[−bq2∗ + (a − bq ∗ ) − cj + (cH − cj )δ] = 0
1−δ
..
.
α
∗
∗
[−bqn + (a − bq ) − cj + (cH − cj )δ] = 0.
1−δ
Solving this system yields
a − cj + (cH − cj )δ n
(12)
b
n+1
which is the perfect Bayes’ Nash equilibrium quantity. Given the assumption of n symmetric firms,
the equilibrium quantity for firm i is
q∗ =

qi∗ =

a − cj + (cH − cj )δ
.
b(n + 1)

(13)

Given (13), I continue backward inducting. The choice of I, in deriving the perfect Bayes’ Nash
equilibrium, is
max P (H)m(qi∗ )cFHV + P (L)m(qi∗ )cFLV .
I

Given (13), I find that the objective function is linear in I which implies a corner solution. The
slope of the optimal investment level is
−α +

α(cH − cL )(1 + δ)(2a + cH (δ − 1) − cL (1 + δ))
b(n + 1)2 (1 − δ)

which is positive if
0<b<

(cH − cL )(1 + δ)(2a + cH (δ − 1) − cL (1 + δ))
(n + 1)2 (1 − δ)

(14)

holds and negative if
b>

(cH − cL )(1 + δ)(2a + cH (δ − 1) − cL (1 + δ))
(n + 1)2 (1 − δ)
8

(15)

holds. Assuming inequality (14) holds implies that the equilibrium strategy is to choose I = 1
which implies low costs. Given this equilibrium strategy, solving for the firm’s expected profit, I
find that
(a − cL − (cH − cL )δn)(a − cL + (cH − cL )δ)
πi∗ (qi∗ ) =
.
(16)
b(n + 1)2
Assuming (15) holds implies that the equilibrium strategy is to choose I = 0 which implies high
costs. Given this equilibrium strategy, solving for the firm’s expected profit, I find that
πi∗ (qi∗ ) =

4.3

(a − cH )2
.
b(n + 1)2

(17)

Welfare Implications

If I assume (14) holds, then the equilibrium investment level is I = 1 under both regimes. Therefore,
conditioned on j = L, the optimal output levels under historical cost and fair value will be (9) and
(12), respectively. Conditioned on j = L, (12) > (9) which implies that output is higher under
fair value. However, expected firm profits for historical cost and fair value are (11) and (16),
respectively. (11) > (16) which implies that expected profit is greater under historical cost. Social
welfare under historical cost is
Z q∗
n(a − cL )(cL (n − 2) + a(4 + n))
p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
2b(1 + n)2
0
while social welfare under fair value is
Z q∗
n(a + cH δ − cL (1 + δ))(a(4 + n) − 3cH nδ + cL (−2 + n + 3nδ))
p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
.
2b(1 + n)2
0
Therefore, welfare is greater under fair value if a ≤

7cL
5 .

If I assume (15) holds, then the equilibrium investment level is I = 1 under historical cost and
I = 0 under fair value. Therefore, conditioned on j = L, the optimal output level under historical
cost is (9) and conditioned on j = H, the optimal output level under fair value is (12). Under
these conditions, (9) > (12). Expected firm profits for historical cost and fair value are (11) and
(17) respectively. (11) > (17) implies that expected profit is greater under historical cost. Social
welfare under historical cost is
Z q∗
n(a − cL )(cL (n − 2) + a(4 + n))
p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
2b(1 + n)2
0
while social welfare under fair value is
Z q∗
n(a − cH )(cH (n − 2) + a(4 + n))
p(q) dq + π ∗ (q ∗ ) =
.
2b(1 + n)2
0
Therefore, welfare is greater under historical cost.

It would therefore seem that the results from part 3 extend nicely to the case of n firms.
9

5

Conclusion

Given the standard monopoly and n firm oligopoly models as proposed, the general result is that
historical cost is strictly preferred by the firm whether that firm be a monopolist or an oligopolist
(a finding consistent with [9]). This seems to fly in the face of conventional wisdom (fair value
detractors) which says manager’s prefer fair value as it provides them with more wiggle room
when reporting costs. However, these results suggest that in an efficient market, if the manager is
tasked with choosing a non-depreciable investment, historical cost is always preferred.

As far as the aggregate economy is concerned, different market conditions lead to greater social
welfare under different regimes. If the market is elastic enough (if b is small enough), then social
welfare is greater under fair value. Whereas, if the market is inelastic enough (if b is large enough),
then social welfare is greater under historical cost. This result challenges the assumption that fair
value is better for the economy because it provides more relevant information to users of financial
statements. These results suggest that there is an output-information trade-off: a fair value regime
trades higher output levels for “better information.” Furthermore, one would conclude that there
are unintended consequences associated with the way in which assets are measured. If accounting
standards change the incentives of managers and lead to sub-optimal market outcomes, as these
results would suggest they do, such standards cannot seemingly be justified by the existing
conceptual framework.

These results are interesting, though not as general as they could be. Future research would
consider generalizing functional forms used herein. For example, the probability and inverse demand
functions were both linear resulting in only corner solutions. Such functional form assumptions
sacrifice generalizability for the sake of tractability. Future research would also consider adjusting
the models to account for earnings management, conservatism, disclosure behavior, etc. Whether
these results hold experimentally is another important question.
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